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I. Introduction
At common law, the privilege against self-incrimination protects the
accused solely against compelled testimony in formal proceedings. Under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the privilege received
constitutional protection2 and a pre-trial right against self-incrimination
was subsequently created. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) stated in
the early 1990s that the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of
fundamental justice under s. 7,3 “perhaps the single, most important
organizing principle of criminal justice”.4 This allowed for the protection of
the accused against compelled confessions outside of the narrow context of
formal proceedings.
Despite the significant developments of the protection against selfincrimination, limitations to its application remain. 5 The present chapter
will address one of these limits: the exclusion of individuals subjected to Mr.
*

1
2
3
4
5

Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. I would like to thank
my colleagues Steve Coughlan, Rob Currie, and Archie Kaiser for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Vanessa Kinnear, a third-year JD student,
whose fantastic research assistance made this chapter possible.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
Ibid., ss. 11(c), 13.
Ibid., s. 7.
R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) at para. 37 [P(MB)].
For commentary on the limits of the rights against self-incrimination see Lisa Dufraimont,
“The Interrogation Trilogy and the Protections for Interrogated Suspects in Canadian
Law” (2011), 54 SCLR (2d) 309; Lisa Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle against SelfIncrimination under the Charter” (2012), 57 SCLR (2d) 241 [Dufraimont, “The
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Big undercover operations from the protection of the right against selfincrimination under s. 7, on the basis that its application is limited to
confessions obtained while the individual was in state detention. 6 In order to
assess whether a legal protection should apply to a certain situation, one
ought to look at the rationales for which the protection exists and how that
pairs with the situations at issue.7 I will argue that, despite the suspect not
being in physical state detention, the very basis on which Mr. Big operations
function violates all rationales behind the right against self-incrimination.
In fact, as others have argued earlier on, Mr. Big has been consciously
designed “to violate the spirit of so many rules without ever quite violating
the letter of them”.8 Thus, despite efforts in the latter years to create a new
evidentiary rule in Hart9 and Mack10 to regulate these operations, the very
design of the operations is based on violating Charter values, while evading
any stated procedural rules that may uphold them. Refusal to subject
confessions obtained through such tactics to constitutional scrutiny, on the
basis that this operation does not fall under the literal proscription for the
current framework for s. 7, means that the state continues to be allowed to
use its resources to coerce and manipulate the individual into contributing
to his or her own prosecution. This significantly undermines core values of
our justice system.
In Part II of this chapter I will provide an overview of the development,
scope and rationale of the right against self-incrimination. This right,
stemming from the common-law privilege against self-incrimination, is
foundational to the coherence of the adversarial justice system. I will also
address the importance the protection has in ensuring the reliability of
evidence, preventing abuse of process, and upholding normative concepts
related to free will, autonomy and dignity. While the latter rationales are
controversial, they are essential to the understanding of choice and
coercion, which have jurisprudentially been deemed to be the heart of the
right against self-incrimination.

6
7

8

9
10

Patchwork Principle”]; Hamish Stewart, “The Grant Trilogy and the Right Against SelfIncrimination” (2009), 66 CR (6th) 97 [Stewart, “The Grant Trilogy”]; Paul Calarco, “R v
Nedelcu: Whatever Happened to a Large and Liberal Interpretation of the Charter?”
(2012), 96 CR 438; Dale E Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R v Singh — A Meaningless Right
to Silence with Dangerous Consequences” (2007), 51 CR (6th) 250.
For detention as a requirement for the application of the pre-trial right against selfincrimination see R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) at 131 [Hebert].
James Sprague, “Good Cop/Bad Cop: Charter Rights Against Self-Incrimination and
Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Context of Investigations in Support of a
Regulatory Scheme” (2003), 16 Can J Admin L & Prac 161; See also Hebert, ibid. at para.
118.
Steve Coughlan, “Threading Together Abuse of Process and Exclusion of Evidence: How
it Became Possible to Rebuke Mr. Big” (2017), 71 SCLR (2d) 415 at 416; See also R. v.
Hart, 2012 NLCA 61 (N.L. C.A.) at para. 154, affirmed 2014 CarswellNfld 215, 2014
CarswellNfld 216 (S.C.C.) [Hart NLCA].
Hart NLCA, ibid.
R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [Mack].
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In Part III I will first provide an overview of how Mr. Big operations
function, as well as of the current legal framework and point out some of this
framework’s shortcomings. Second, I will discuss how each rationale
mentioned in Part II is violated by Mr. Big operations. By using post-Hart
examples, I argue that, despite its new regulation, the right against selfincrimination continues to be breached by this technique.
I conclude by arguing that the Hart framework did not satisfactorily
protect Charter values and failed to consider many concerns that are at the
forefront of the protection against self-incrimination. I maintain that it is
unlikely that any regulatory framework could efficiently bring this sting,
created to circumvent rules, within the legal realm. The technique impacts so
many core principles of our legal system, that despite any of its perceived
benefits, it may be better for it to be outlawed.

II. Development, Scope and Rationales of the Protection against
Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination developed at common law in
the second half of the 18th century, as an essential component of the
adversarial criminal trial system,11 according to which the accused cannot
be compelled to assist in her own prosecution. At common law, the privilege
extended solely to the prohibition against compelling the accused to speak in
formal proceedings. While this privilege received statutory protection under
the Evidence Act,12 it remained restricted to protecting the accused against
having to testify in formal settings.
Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the privilege was
constitutionalized under s. 11 (c): “any person charged with an offence
has the right not to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect
of the offence”.13 Section 13 guarantees that a witness testifying in a
proceeding has the right not to have incriminating evidence given in that
proceeding used against him in another proceeding (use immunity).14 These
two specific provisions added little to the existing common-law protection,
as their application is limited to compelled testimonial self-incrimination in
court. The privilege, under these provisions, like at common law, applies to
the accused qua witness and not qua accused.15 That is to say, it does not
protect the accused against being forced to speak during investigations,
prior to formal proceedings.
11
12
13
14
15

John H. Langbein, “The Historical Origins of the Right against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law” (1994), 92:5 Mich L Rev 1047 at 1047, 1066, 1084.
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 5.
Charter, supra note 1, s. 11(c).
Ibid., s. 13.
David M. Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination and the Case to Meet: The Legacy of Chief Justice
Lamer” (2000), 5 Can Crim L Rev 63 at 66 [Paciocco, “Case to Meet”].
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In the decade following the entrenchment of the Charter, the Supreme
Court of Canada, working with the privilege, applied a purposive
interpretation of the Charter that allowed for the gradual development of
the law of self-incrimination beyond the narrow confines of formal
testimony.16 As Paciocco describes, Justice Lamer weeded out the concepts
of choice and case to meet17 (meaning that it is on the prosecution to build a
case that disproves the accused’s innocence) behind the privilege. This led to
an understanding that police actions before formal proceedings can
frustrate the ability to exercise real choice, by allowing police to obtain
indirectly before trial, that which the Charter prohibits the Crown from
obtaining directly at trial.18 Building the theory of choice into the law of selfincrimination allowed the court to establish the principle against selfincrimination as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7,19 extending
the protection against self-incrimination outside the formal settings, with
the right to silence as its central manifestation.20
Placed in its systemic context, the law of self-incrimination has
developed organically. The expansion of this protection has often been
correlated with the adversarial nature of criminal trials and the concomitant
development of other rules of evidence grounded in the law of selfincrimination:21 the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the case
to meet,22 as well as subsequent rules such as the duty of the Crown to
disclose its case,23 the lack of a concomitant obligation of the defence to
disclose,24 prohibition on the Crown to reopen its case once it closed it,25 etc.
Furthermore, under s. 7, the principle against self-incrimination has led to
the creation of rules that expand the law against self-conscription.26 For
instance, the use immunity covered by s. 13 has been extended under s. 7 to
physical evidence obtained as a result of compelled testimony.27 Furthermore, s. 7 has been deemed to protect against individuals being legislatively
compelled,28 and to protect witnesses from testifying where the main
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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27
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For a full account of the development of the law of self-incrimination under Chief Justice
Lamer, see ibid.
Paciocco, “Case to Meet”, supra note 15 at 67.
Ibid. at 75.
Ibid. at 66; Hebert, supra note 6; See also Fariborz Davoudi, “The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination (V)” (2017), RegQuest 10-06-02 [Davoudi, “(V)”].
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 247; R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] 1
S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.) at para. 93 [S(RJ)]; Paciocco, “Case to Meet”, supra note 15 at 68.
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 245-250.
Ibid. at 250; Don Stuart, “Chief Justice Antonio Lamer: An Extraordinary Judicial Record
of Reform of the Canadian Criminal Justice System” 5 Can Crim L Rev 51 at 53.
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) at 333 [Stinchcombe].
Ibid.
P(MB), supra note 4 at para. 42.
For a description see Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 247.
British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) at para. 5
[Branch].
R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) at paras. 44-45 [White].
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purpose of the compelled testimony is to obtain evidence against that
witness.29 Thus, the principle against self-incrimination, descending from
the much narrower privilege against self-incrimination, has evolved in the
Canadian jurisprudence as an overarching umbrella tying together discreet
rules of evidence.30
In the context of this system of procedural rules, the right against selfincrimination recognizes the accused’s right to choose,31 which is key in
upholding the adversarial principles of the criminal trial. The adversarial
system presupposes that there are two autonomous entities opposing each
other.32 That means that the individual’s interests will not always coincide
with those of the State, and she can choose to protect her own interests. Fair
treatment requires that the State be restrained from coercing the individual
to provide evidence against themselves in order to build the State’s case.33
Compelling an individual to provide information would mean taking
control away.34 In the same vein, removing choice means that the defence is
denied an opportunity to test the case of the prosecution, which is one of the
purposes of the trial.35 As Paciocco argues, the principle against selfincrimination “is an indispensable corollary of the principle of a case to meet
which helps to define the accusatorial system which, in turn, exists in order
to vindicate the rule of law”.36
The above systemic37 explanations of the existence of the right against
self-incrimination are intertwined with pragmatic and normative rationales
for the existence of the right. It is settled that the Canadian law of selfincrimination, like other common-law jurisdictions, is built around the idea
of choice and the absence of coercion (defined as “free and informed
consent”38) in the suspect’s decision to engage with authorities39 Choice
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37

38

39

Branch, supra note 27 at para. 7.
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 246; Paciocco, “Case to Meet”,
supra note 15 at 64.
Hebert, supra note 6 at para. 137; R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.) at para. 23
[Broyles]; White, supra note 28 at para. 55; S(RJ), supra note 20 at para. 238.
Davoudi, “(V)”, supra note 19.
Michael Plaxton, “Seizing What’s Bred in the Bone: The Unconstitutionality of Canada’s
DNA Warrant Provisions” (2000-2001), 12 Nat’l J Const L 227 at 237.
Davoudi, “(V)”, supra note 19.
See generally Paciocco, “Case to Meet”, supra note 15.
David Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination: Removing the Coffin Nails” (1990), 35 McGill LJ 73
at 103 [Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”]. On the relationship between the privilege against
self-incrimination and the adversarial system see Langbein, supra note 11.
The terminology of “systemic” versus “individual” rationales is borrowed from Davoudi,
“(V)”, supra note 19, who uses systemic to refer to rationales that uphold the coherence of
the procedural system, and individual to refer to rationales independent from procedure
(such as pragmatic and normative rationales).
R. v. Jones, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.) at para. 31, Lamer CJC dissenting [Jones], cited
with approval by the majority in R. v. B. (S.A.), 2003 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) at para. 59 [B(SA)]
and R. v. Brown, 2002 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) at para. 92.
Hebert, supra note 6 at paras. 103-104; Jones, ibid. at para. 42; R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R.
874 (S.C.C.) at paras. 73-74; White, supra note 28; R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.)
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guides the protection against self-incrimination for reasons that go beyond
simply upholding the procedural structure of the adversarial trial and
providing coherence within the system of evidentiary rules. Most scholars
agree that the requirements of choice and absence of coercion confirm three
individual pillars of the law of self-incrimination: reliability of evidence;
prevention of abuse of process; and upholding individual autonomy,
sovereignty, dignity, and privacy interests.40
Reliability, the concern that compelled confessions can be false and
lead to wrongful convictions, is widely recognized as a rationale for
protection under s. 7.41 Abuse of process is also accepted as a basis of the
right against self-incrimination. This rationale is built on the idea that there
is an inherent imbalance of resources between the State and the accused. To
maintain the fairness of the adversarial process and to protect the justice
system, the State is not allowed to use its resources to intimidate or trick the
accused into contributing to his own prosecution.42 Under this rationale,
the privilege against self-incrimination is about counterbalancing the State’s
overwhelming position of power in relation to the individual. 43
Some believe that these two are the only relevant rationales that
should be considered when assessing the extent of the right against selfincrimination, because they protect against abusive police tactics and
wrongful convictions without interfering too much with the state’s interest
in protecting the community.44 Nonetheless, as the law currently stands,
reliable evidence which was obtained in violation of s. 7, even when the
persuasion appears to be mild (falling short of abuse of process) is still
generally excluded.45 In other words, reliability and abuse of process cannot
by themselves justify the existing law.46 This may be because the concepts of

40

41

42
43
44

45

at para. 6; P(MB), supra note 4; S(RJ), supra note 20 at para. 227. See also Dufraimont,
“The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 252; Hamish Stewart, “The Confession Rule
and the Charter” (2009), 54 McGill LJ 517 at 521 [Stewart, “The Confessions Rule”].
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 250; Davioudi, “(V)”, supra note
19; David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law
Inc, 2015) at 306; Steven Penney, “Compelled Communications, the Admissibility of
Defendants’ Previous Testimony, and Inferences from Defendants’ Silence” (2004), 48
CLQ 474 at 492 [Penney, “Compelled Communications”].
See e.g. White, supra note 28 at para. 43; Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”, supra note 36 at
86-87; Steven Penney, “The Continuing Evolution of the s. 7 Self-Incrimination Principle:
R v White” (1999), 24 CR 247.
Paciocco, “Case to Meet”, supra note 15 at 67.
Stuart, supra note 22 at 52; Benissa Yau, “Making the Right to Silence a Meaningful One”
(2006), 38 CR 226 at 228.
See e.g. Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-Incrimination: The Wayward Path of
Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era - Part I: Justifications for Rules Preventing
Self-Incrimination” (2003), 48 Crim LQ 249 at 249 [Penney, “The Wayward Path”].
Imagine the following scenario: an undercover officer is planted in the same cell as a
suspect, and he simply asks, “what are you here for?” The suspect, prompted by the
question, gives a detailed account of what he has done, and his account leads to the finding
of corroborative evidence which confirms the reliability of his confession. Applying
Hebert, supra note 6 at para. 181, s. 7 is triggered and the confession is excluded.
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choice and freedom from coercion are built on a normative understanding
that the State has an obligation to preserve human dignity and autonomy.47
Paciocco and Stuesser have argued that privacy and inherent dignity
are as important to the law of self-incrimination as reliability and abuse of
process,48 and that “there is something reprehensible about seizing
information stored in the memory of the accused”.49 Compulsion to make
statements is an invasion of privacy with legal, psychological, social, and
political consequences, an assault on personhood that impacts freedom and
dignity.50 Conscription strips people of selfhood and the dignity that flows
from being an independent, moral agent.51 Stewart maintains that human
dignity is a normative benchmark for Charter rights, which at the minimum
means that an individual should be treated as an end and not as a means to
an end.52 Compelling testimony is a way of treating someone as a means to
obtaining a confession, frustrating the presumption of innocence 53 and
removing the burden of the Crown from building a case against the accused
who only then needs to respond.54 Thus, normative concerns flowing from
choice as the core of the protection against self-incrimination also
contribute to ensuring the systemic coherence of the rules of evidence and
procedure.
Normative interpretations are essential for the understanding of the
right against self-incrimination, as long as choice remains a key concept at
the heart of this right.55 Canadian courts have confirmed in their rulings that
the protection against self-incrimination, with its two facets (the privilege
against self-incrimination in formal proceedings, and the pre-trial right
against self-incrimination under s. 7) operates around the notion of choice
and absence of coercion, building on procedural, pragmatic, and normative
rationales. In Hebert, where the SCC embraced the principle against selfincrimination as a principle of fundamental justice and affirmed the
accused’s pre-trial right to silence when questioned by authorities, the Court
46

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Paciocco, “Case to Meet”, supra note 15 at 69; Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”, supra note
36 at 84-85; Penney, “The Wayward Path”, supra note 44 at 256-257; Penney, “Compelled
Communications”, supra note 40 at 250.
See especially Stewart, “The Grant Trilogy”, supra note 5 at 99; see also Plaxton, supra note
33 at 238; Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”, supra note 36 at 88-89.
Paciocco & Streusser, supra note 40 at 306.
Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”, supra note 36 at 88.
Fariborz Davoudi, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (VI)” (2017), RegQuest 1007-01 [Davoudi, “(VI)”], citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Plaxton, supra note 33 at 238.
Stewart, “The Confessions Rule”, supra note 39 at 519.
Hamish Stewart, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Reconsidering Redmayne’s
Rethinking” (2016), 20:2 Intl J Evidence & Proof 95 at 98-99 [Stewart, “The Privilege”].
Paciocco, “Self-Incrimination”, supra note 36 at 89.
Even scholars who disagree with maintaining choice as the basis of the right against selfincrimination agree that choice cannot be dissociated from free will and autonomy. See
Penney, “The Wayward Path”, supra note 44.
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emphasized the importance of choice, saying: “if the suspect chooses not to
[make a statement], the state is not entitled to use its superior power to
override the suspect’s will; and negate his or her own choice,” 56 because:
[t]o permit the authorities to trick the suspect into making a confession to them
after he or she has exercised the right of conferring with counsel and declined
to make a statement is to permit the authorities to do indirectly what the
Charter does not permit them to do directly. This cannot be in accordance
with the purpose of the Charter.57

Thus, statements extracted from the suspect during interrogation through
methods that are oppressive are prohibited. Equally, information elicited
from the accused by a police informant or an undercover officer while the
accused is in police detention is a violation of s. 7.58
Nonetheless, the Court imposed some limitations on the application
of the right to silence. Notably, the statement made to the undercover officer
or the informant must have been “elicited”59 (that is, there must be a causal
link between the agent and the incriminating statement).60 If the agent were
to simply observe the accused and the accused spontaneously confessed, or
if the accused voluntarily made statements to cellmates, s. 7 would not be
infringed.61 The Court also excluded “an undercover operation prior to
detention”62 from the application of the right. Curiously, in attempting to
justify this exclusion, the Court sought to explain it through recourse to
coercion, by alleging that an individual is significantly more vulnerable to
persuasion when in detention: “[t]he individual from whom the information
is sought is not under the control of the state. There is no need to protect him
from the greater power of the state”.63
The limits discussed in Hebert, as well as those introduced in
subsequent cases that have directly or indirectly contributed to shrinking
the right,64 have been criticized for creating an incoherent regime that does
not square well with the concept of freedom of choice.65 For instance, while
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

65

Hebert, supra note 6 at para. 122.
Ibid. at para. 123.
Ibid. at para. 132.
Ibid. at para. 129.
Broyles, supra note 31 at para. 37.
Hebert, supra note 6 at para. 133.
Ibid. at para. 131.
Ibid.
R. v. B. (S.A.), supra note 38 (section 7 does not apply to DNA evidence); R. v. Grant, 2009
SCC 32 (S.C.C.) (removes the assumption that conscripted evidence renders the trial
unfair); R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) (the Court decided that while the accused has a
right to silence during the interrogation, this right does not mean that the police have to
stop asking him questions over a prolonged period of time); R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35
(S.C.C.) at para. 116; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 (S.C.C.) (the latter three all apply a
restrictive interpretation on what tactics supress voluntariness).
See Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5; Michael A. Johnston, “Why
Did the Fat Lady Singh? A Case Comment on R v Grant” (2010), 56 CLQ 437 [Johnston,
“Fat Lady Singh”]; Stewart, “The Privilege”, supra note 53; Tim Quigley, “Principled
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the individual is vulnerable in police detention and under interrogation,
there are additional contexts where the individual is at risk. The underpinnings of the right cast doubt on other undercover operations, not just
those undertaken when the suspect is in police custody66 and the line in the
sand drawn by the Court seems at odds with the Court’s repeated
commitment67 to upholding the freedom of choice of the individual
engaging with authorities.
To conclude, the protection against self-incrimination plays a
significant procedural and substantive role in our criminal justice system.
At its heart, the protection is about ensuring that an individual is not
coerced into contributing to his or her own prosecution. Seen through the
lenses of coercion, the protection has both systemic and individual
implications. On one hand, this protection connects disparate rules of
procedure, such as the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, a
case to meet, and ensures a coherent system. Coercion would negate all of
them. On the other hand, the protection is concerned with ensuring that the
evidence obtained is reliable, that the state cannot use its resources to coerce
individuals into cooperating (abuse of process), and that the individual’s
choice and personal autonomy are respected. In the next section, I take the
position that Mr. Big-elicited statements present all these concerns. 68

III. Mr. Big Undercover Operations
A. Characteristics and Legal Framework
Mr. Big is different from other undercover investigations. Usually, in
the latter, police infiltrate a criminal organization with the purpose of
catching the suspect in action. Police do not invent the crime, nor do they
lure the suspect into it. The officer is merely joining a criminal enterprise that
already existed and gains access to information and earns the suspect’s trust
because of the officer’s efforts to fit into the criminal world. The purpose of
the operations is diverse: it may be to gather evidence against certain people,
or to obtain intelligence on different types of crimes, gangs, etc.

66
67
68

Reform of Criminal Procedure,” in Don Stuart et al, Towards a Clear and Just Criminal
Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 253; Dale E. Ives &
Christopher Sherrin, “R v Singh — A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous
Consequences” (2006), 51 CR (6th) 250; Patrick Healy, “The Right to Remain Silent:
Value Added, But How Much?” (1990), 77 CR (3d) 190 at 200.
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at para 29.
Broyles, supra note 31 at para. 23; White, supra note 28 at para. 43; R. v. S. (R.J.), supra
note 20 at paras. 81, 83.
For a similar opinion on this point see Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note
5 at 254-262.
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In Mr. Big scenarios, the police create a criminal organization from
scratch. All people involved in it are undercover officers, or their agents. 69
The operation is generally built around a single suspect and the goal is to get
the suspect to confess to a specific crime. The suspect is observed and often
wiretapped for long periods of time, during which time the police become
familiar with the suspects’ habits, friends, hobbies, routines, and most of all,
his or her vulnerabilities. It is at this stage that an undercover officer will
insert him or herself into the suspect’s life by filling a void. The individuals
that are subjected to such operations are often alienated, without a job,
without friends, and with tense family relationships. The operation works
most efficiently if the suspect is predisposed to outside influences due to low
IQ, social stigma, a lifetime of racial discrimination, mental illness, poverty,
or has other vulnerabilities.70 The suspect is befriended and initially offered
a job (generally this involves driving around, keeping an eye out while the
undercover officer undertakes some transactions, or delivering parcels).
The undercover officer will confide in the suspect and be by her side as much
as possible. Sometimes the suspect will be encouraged to break or alienate
family relationships and friends, and to dedicate her life to this new
welcoming organization that makes her feel valuable.71 The suspect’s
involvement in the organization will also be intensified. The jobs she will be
assigned will appear to be increasingly illegal. She will be exposed to
manifestations of violence and other practices that are meant to show her
that she is associating with hardened criminals.72 At one point, the suspect
meets the boss, Mr. Big, as a reward for the work the individual did, or to
interview for a better position within the organization. In all scenarios, Mr.
Big wants to be able to trust his people. As a result, the individual’s past will
come into discussion. Generally, Mr. Big will bring up the crime under
investigation and will request the truth about it. He will not take no for an
answer, and a range of strategies are employed to convince the suspect to
confess. For example, Mr. Big shows that he has access to (forged)
incriminating police documents, 73 offers to make the subject’s legal
problems disappear,74 or exposes the individual to an oppressive environ69
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Timothy E. Moore et al, “Deceit, Betrayal, and the Search for Truth: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009), 55 Crim LQ 348 at 348
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Kouri T. Keenan & Joan Brockman, Mr. Big: Exposing Undercover Investigations in
Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2010) at 50-51. The authors have determined that
from 89 cases, 11 suspects were Indigenous and 29 were from very poor social
backgrounds. Others (though numbers were not available) had very poor education or
reduced cognitive capacity.
See Hart NLCA, supra note 8.
See Dix v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 ABQB 580 (Alta. Q.B.), additional reasons
2002 CarswellAlta 1006 (Alta. Q.B.) [Dix]; R. v. Keene, 2014 ONSC 7190 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[Keene].
R. v. Simmonds, 2002 BCCA 332 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2003 CarswellBC
396, 2003 CarswellBC 397 (S.C.C.) [Simmonds].
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ment. In the latter case, the suspect may be led to believe that the
organization will not tolerate people that cannot be trusted by being shown
fake beatings, killings, kidnappings, or hit and run events,75 implying that if
she does not confess she will have to leave the organization, or she will
remain on the side lines of it.76
The use of Mr. Big obtained evidence existed in a legal vacuum until
2014. The common-law confessions rule did not apply. Under this rule, a
statement made to a person in authority is presumed to be inadmissible
unless proven voluntary by the Crown. However, the suspect had to know
that s/he was talking to a person in authority.77 The right to silence under s. 7
did not apply because Hebert78 required the individual to be in state
detention for this protection to apply.79 The statements would not be
excluded as hearsay evidence, because they fell neatly within the categorical
exceptions to the hearsay rule.80 The law of entrapment would not apply
because the target was never charged with the offences he committed during
the operation, but only with the one he confessed to undercover officers to
have committed prior to the operation.81 In the years leading up to the
SCC’s decision in Hart, scholars had been divided on how and which law
should be adapted to provide some regulatory basis for this type of
operation.82 However, the fact that, despite the many laws that Mr. Big
appeared to be violating it could still circumvent the letter of all of them, was
not the product of chance. Rather, it was by design.83
Finally, in 2014, the SCC created a new common-law confessions
rule84 to assess the admissibility of statements made by suspects during Mr.
Big operations. For the majority, Moldaver J. held that the main concerns
raised by the Mr. Big technique are the reliability of the evidence obtained,
the prejudice such evidence may bring to the accused, and the risk of police
misconduct during the sting.85 As a result, he proposed a two-prong
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(N.S. S.C.) [Buckley]; R. v. M. (M.), 2015 ABQB 692 (Alta. Q.B.), [M(M)].
Dix, supra note 72; R. v. Terrico, 2005 BCCA 361 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2006
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R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.); Mack, supra note 10.
R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 (S.C.C.) [Oickle].
Hebert, supra note 6.
On this see Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5 at 258-262.
To this point see Coughlan, supra note 8 at 417.
On this see ibid. at 418.
Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle”, supra note 5; Nikos Harris, “The Less-travelled
Exclusionary Path: Sections 7 and 24(1) of the Charter and R v Hart” (2014), 7 CR (7th)
287; David Milward, “Opposing Mr. Big in Principle” (2013), 46:1 UBC L Rev 81; Amar
Khoday, “Scrutinizing Mr. Big: Police Trickery, the Confessions Rule and the Need to
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Coughlan, supra note 8, at 438.
R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) [Hart].
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approach that would address these concerns to fill the “legal vacuum” in
which such operations were run. Thus, where the state recruits an individual
into a fictitious criminal organization, the statements made by the suspect
would be presumptively inadmissible. In order to overcome this presumption, the Crown has to show that the probative value (which flows from its
reliability) of the evidence is higher than the prejudice flowing from the bad
character evidence embodied by the fact that the individual engaged in a
criminal organization.86 The Court believed that such prejudice can be
mitigated by giving limiting instructions to the jury or by excluding parts of
the evidence that are not essential to the narrative.87 The second prong was
created to prevent abuse of process. In particular, the Court found that
violence or threat of violence, serious inducements, or taking advantage of
someone’s vulnerabilities such as mental health issues, addictions or
youthfulness, are unacceptable forms of coercion that require the exclusion
of evidence.88 Moldaver J. believed that this new common-law rule would be
sufficient to uphold Charter values and would adequately address concerns
that related to the right against self-incrimination.89
A full critique of the SCC majority’s legal framework, and of its
subsequent applications has been developed by this author and other
scholars elsewhere,90 and it is outside the scope of this chapter. On the one
hand, the framework itself has a number of limitations especially since,
unlike the protection against self-incrimination, it is concerned only with the
reliability of evidence and extreme forms of abuse of process. On the other
hand, Mr. Big has always been about evading exact proscriptions, and, as
discussed in the next sub-section, it has continued to do so post-Hart, and
arguably, would continue to do so under any framework.
As a general point, and regardless of any inherent shortcomings of the
framework itself, it is worth noting that the decision appears to have had a
different effect then initially predicted. For instance, some were expecting
that under the two-prong approach in Hart, the use of these operations
would decrease.91 The numbers available do not support this assertation.
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For example, the RCMP stated that between 1990 (when the operation
came into use) and 2008, the sting was employed 350 times.92 The target is
said to have been charged in 75 percent of cases, and from the cases that went
to trial, the target was convicted in 95 percent of cases.93 While the same
kind of data is not available after 2014, in four years (summer 2014-summer
2018) the Hart framework has been applied in court at least 54 times.94 This
number only reflects the operations where charges were laid and where the
accused did not plead guilty (so this number is likely lower than the total
number of times the operation was actually employed in those four years).
In addition, despite the holding in Hart that Mr. Big obtained evidence is
prima facia inadmissible, post-Hart, the evidence was in fact admitted in all
but six cases.95
For the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on showing that Mr. Big
operations breach all of the rationales of the principle against selfincrimination under s. 7 of the Charter. In a different form, a s. 7 argument
was put forward by the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Hart.96 The
majority of that Court accepted that there is an overarching principle
against self-incrimination that applies independently97 because some of the
Mr. Big operations may raise concerns related to the reliability of the
statement, coercion, the existence of an adversarial relationship between
state and suspect, and abuse of power.98 In addition, the Court also
maintained that expanding the notion of detention under s. 7 is aligned with
the Hebert decision which justified detention as a limit due to increased state
control over people in custody. In some Mr. Big cases, the Court asserted,
the state control is so intense that the suspect is in functional detention. 99
The Court of Appeal proposed a case-by-case approach to determining the
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framework when analyzing the undercover investigation, but it was not in fact a Mr. Big
operation.
The evidence was excluded due to lack of reliability (Buckley, supra note 74) or abuse of
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QCCA 1517 (C.A. Que.), leave to appeal refused 2016 CarswellQue 3271, 2016
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537 (Ont. C.J.) [M(S)]; R. v. South, 2018 ONSC 604 (Ont. S.C.J.) [South]; R. v. Nuttall,
2016 BCSC 1404 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed 2018 CarswellBC 3405 (B.C. C.A.) [Nuttall].
Hart NLCA, supra note 8.
Ibid. at para. 205.
For a description of the Court’s holding on this point see Lisa Dufraimont, “R v Hart:
Building a Screen for Mr. Big Confessions” (2012), 97 CR (6th) 104 at 108 [Dufraimont,
“Screen”].
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situations where, even outside of formal police custody, the state’s role
amounts to de facto detention, and thus triggers the application of s. 7 and
the right to silence.100
In her partial dissent at the SCC, Karakatsanis J. identified all the
concerns raised by such operations as being foundational to the right to
silence: the reliability of evidence, the fact that they “compromise the
suspects’ autonomy” and that they “raise concerns about abusive state
conduct”.101 However, unlike the Hebert scenarios, where evidence elicited
by undercover officers from a detained suspect is automatically considered
to breach s. 7 and almost always excluded, Karakatsanis J. proposed a caseby-case approach, based on four factors (reliability, abusive state conduct,
coercion, and the presence of an adversarial relationship),102 to assess
whether the principle against self-incrimination has been infringed. This test
would have been more faithful to Charter values than the majority’s test,
even though the framework is loose, it is unclear how effective its protection
would have been in practice, and a case-by-case approach to the application
of s. 7 is not optimal.
As I will now show, the very design of Mr. Big operations raises most
of the concerns which the right against self-incrimination aims to protect
against. Despite Moldaver J’s statement to the contrary,103 the current
framework did not and, arguably no framework could, make a Mr. Big
operation respectful of Charter values as they relate to the right against selfincrimination. Failure to recognize this perpetuates the arbitrary limits to
the protection, increases the disconnect of the application of the right to its
rationales and diminishes the value of the protection against selfincrimination, as well as of the related criminal rules of evidence and
procedure (the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the case to
meet etc.). It also means that these operations continue to be constitutional,
even though, judged by the arguments used to grant Charter protection to
suspects in other settings, the premise of Mr. Big operations itself (tricking
or pressuring the individual to confess in a highly state-controlled scenario)
is constitutionally suspect. Aside from reliability concerns that may have
been, to a degree, addressed by the new framework,104 the other values
100
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promoted by the principle against self-incrimination continue to be
tarnished by Mr. Big operations. Thus, advocating for the extension of
the right against self-incrimination over such operations is more than simply
an intellectual exercise, or a matter of choosing between two frameworks of
equal value and consequence. Rather, what is at stake is the protection of
individuals against different forms of coercion and manipulation, as well as
the coherence and integrity of the criminal justice system.
B. Mr. Big Violates All Rationales Behind the Right Against SelfIncrimination
Mr. Big continues to violate all the rationales presented in s. II for the
protection against self-incrimination: reliability, 105 abuse of power, normative concerns regarding personal autonomy and dignity, and procedural
goals related to the adversarial nature of the trial.
It has been widely accepted, both by courts and scholars, that the
principle against self-incrimination is about “the right of the individual to
choose whether to make a statement to the authorities or to remain
silent”.106 The very reason why a Mr. Big operation is started in the first
place is because the suspect chose not to speak to the authorities and thus
police are forced to accept that they do not have sufficient evidence to
proceed with charges. However, despite these shortfalls, police have a
strong suspicion that the suspect is guilty of a serious crime (generally
murder). The nature of the crime and the fact that the agents have allegedly
compelling reasons to believe she is guilty are the justifications provided for
the operation. In other words, police decide that the individual is guilty and
thus start a very expensive107 and lengthy (months or years long) mission108
to obtain the evidence required for a criminal prosecution.
105
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Currently reliability is being measured by courts through the presence or absence of
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Hebert, supra note 6 at para. 104.
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In Otis,109 the SCC clearly stated that certain people are more
susceptible to persuasion than others. It cautioned that special attention
needs to be paid to personal characteristics when the accused is in police
interrogation in order to determine if their s. 7 rights have been infringed. 110
Paradoxically, in Mr. Big scenarios, the state uses its superior power,
financial resources, and people who are highly trained in law enforcement
and psychology to hone in on and target the special characteristics that
would make the suspect more likely to respond to the technique. The factors
mentioned in Otis as increasing vulnerability in the context of police
interrogations (and which are also the ones Moldaver J. in Hart111 and
subsequently in Mack advised against exploiting because it may lead to
abuse of process)112 are the very same ones that continue to be specifically
targeted by agents in order to successfully conduct a Mr. Big operation:
addictions,113 intellectual deficits,114 youthfulness,115 and stress (health,116
financial or psychological117).
These characteristics are used to override the clearly stated wish of the
suspect not to engage with authorities nor to contribute to his own
prosecution. In other words, once they befriend the unsuspecting individual, the officers concentrate on his vulnerabilities. They may offer a familylike environment and friends where the individual has none,118 financial
stability to impoverished people,119 alcohol and drugs to addicts,120 respect
and trust to socially marginalized individuals,121 a stable residence for
underhoused people,122 or the prospect of love.123
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In exchange, after living up to their promises for months on end, all
they want is one confession. The confessions in these scenarios are not
organic; rather they are specifically planned and elicited. In the context of
undercover operations where the accused is in police detention, elicitation
means that if the statement is triggered by the agent124 (which can be as little
as asking “what are you here for?”), it is unconstitutional under s. 7. In the
Mr. Big context, elicitation means that after months of working the suspect,
he is made to believe not only that the confession will have no negative
consequences, but it will have positive ones: it will solidify the individual’s
position within the organization,125 they will continue to make money and
enjoy a lifestyle they never previously had access to,126 and their legal
problems will go away.127 Thus, even if threats and violence are not as
commonly used post-Hart,128 the meaningful choice of the individual is
cancelled out by other police methods.
The non-violent methods employed in Mr. Big, called “soft pressure
tactics” by forensic psychologists, are “qualitatively different but as
effective as harsh pressure tactics”129 (which include threats and violence).
Soft pressure is created by using social influence techniques (such as
reciprocity, consistency, creating a persona the target likes and identifies
with, providing social validation, using authority, and offering the target a
commodity that is scarce to him or her), which have been studied and
validated as being successful in convincing people to acquiesce to a request
or to change behaviour based on real or imagined group pressure.130 By
consulting with trained psychologists,131 the police in each Mr. Big
operation tailor these tools for the specific target, which virtually guarantees
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that a confession will be obtained. Forensic psychologists have found that
many of the tactics used by Mr. Big are contained in Biderman’s Chart of
Coercion132 — a list of tools used to gain control in various contexts (by an
abuser over a victim, for instance) that ensures that the individual will
comply with the requests and will not choose to walk away.133
Since choice and absence of coercion are the essence of the law of selfincrimination,134 overriding meaningful choice has a number of implications for the principle against self-incrimination. Lack of meaningful choice
impacts both the principle’s systemic rationale (the coherence of the justice
system) and its individual rationales (especially abuse of process, individual
autonomy, and dignity).
First, from a systemic perspective, the state takes control over the
individual’s self and thoughts and undermines the supposition that two
autonomous entities are opposing each other,135 which is a core requirement
in an adversarial proceeding. These operations are triggered by the fact that
police cannot build an adequate case against the accused without his help.
They are unable to present the suspect with a “case to meet,” where his
obligation to respond starts.136
Maintaining the balance between law enforcement needs and
individual substantive or procedural rights has always been a challenge.
Indeed, one may say that many law enforcement activities are intrusive, and
yet necessary.137 However, one must recognize that there is not only a
quantitative difference between the different types of law enforcement
tactics (how far do they go, or how strong is the impact on other values and
interests), but also a qualitative difference. Most other techniques
(observation or wiretapping of suspects, interrogation of suspects, collection of DNA evidence, and perhaps even other types of undercover stings)
carry a significant possibility that the evidence collected will point either
towards the guilt or the innocence of the individual. In other words, a
suspect may be cleared through these methods. The ultimate test for
identifying what techniques have gone too far in terms of maintaining a
balanced tension between the procedural standards of adversarial criminal
proceedings (such as the presumption of innocence for instance) and law
enforcement needs, is to ask if these techniques would be perceived as
appropriate when applied to individuals who may turn out to be factually
innocent. No one measures the effectiveness of police questioning or of
DNA evidence by how often these techniques lead to a conviction. Provided
132
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they are employed within certain set limits, we regard them as valid whether
they lead to a conviction or an exoneration, and we expect that some
suspects subjected to these tactics are factually innocent.
Yet Mr. Big techniques are justified by the fact that they are “effective”
in obtaining a conviction against the individual who the police are sure is
guilty, despite the lack of evidence to prove that.138 Indeed, creating an
expensive Kafkaesque universe in which the unsuspecting individual is
drawn into, without meaningful choice of leaving it, and which leads to his
whole life being substantially altered, would appear highly problematic if we
accepted that, like many suspects who are questioned or from whom DNA
evidence is collected, the Mr. Big target may too be factually innocent.
Mr. Big operations are premised on the fact that the only person who
could be guilty of the crime is the targeted individual and physical and
psychological conditions are created to ensure that the suspect will provide a
confession. Thus, what makes these operations different is not that they are
the only ones that may have a tense relationship with the presumption of
innocence or other adversarial principles. Rather, what makes them
different is that this technique does not even allow room for entertaining
the possibility of innocence. There is nothing the individual can do once the
operation started to maintain his autonomy as an opposing force in an
adversarial process. The level of trickery is so high, and the forces working
to overcome the suspect’s will are so intense (such as consulting with
psychologists to find techniques to overcome someone’s will, offering
whatever the individual may desire etc.), that the technique is essentially the
equivalent of getting an individual to plead guilty when he or she has no idea
what the consequences are. An investigative process that coerces the
compliance of an individual to a degree that guarantees that there will be a
case against the suspect, goes beyond any acceptable procedural concessions made in the name of law enforcement. In other words, a technique that
cannot reasonably lead to either a finding of guilt or of innocence, and which
in fact would be considered outrageous if employed against a target who
may turn out to be factually innocent, should never be used against someone
legally innocent (as everyone is until a trier of fact decides differently). Such
a technique constitutes a significant blow to most procedural rules (such as
the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the case to meet etc.) tied
together under the overarching principle against self-incrimination.139
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Second, the operation raises pragmatic concerns related to the unfair
methods in which the state has used its resources to elicit information from
someone who clearly stated he did not wish to talk to the police. The new
Hart framework addresses some of the abuse of process issues, 140 but only
to the extent to which they protect against exposure to violence and the
presence of threats.141 There is no test for the abuse of process prong,142 and
the threshold the claimant needs to reach in order to prove it is high. 143 In
the cases where this prong was discussed, including those where evidence
was excluded, the questions were: is the individual obviously vulnerable and
was there exposure to violence or threats that he may be intimidated by?144
Absent such “hard pressure techniques,”145 courts have found no abuse of
process, despite the fact that Moldaver J. mentioned in Hart that abuse of
process may result from other methods as well (such as very attractive
incentives or taking advantage of vulnerable individuals).146 To give just
one startling example, in the case of R. v. Subramaniam,147 providing money
and alcohol to an impoverished 19-year-old target with a substance
addiction, and making him fall in love with an undercover agent was not
considered an abuse of process because the teenager had “street smarts”148
and no violence was involved.149
Such an analysis constitutes a failure to understand the psychological
impact of manipulation and its relation to coercion and choice that is “free,
informed and voluntary”.150 Post-Hart operations have become subtler,
with the state finding creative and more persuasive ways of convincing
individuals to speak without recourse to threats and violence.151 In this
140
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context, so-called “creativity” of police agents should not be celebrated 152 as
successfully averting abuse of process. Instead of allowing “creativity” to be
yet another tool through which Mr. Big evades the letter of the law, it should
be recognized as a significant form of abuse of process, particularly because
it seeks out and “creatively” uses vulnerabilities and pressure points. This
use of state resources creates a clear adversarial disadvantage to the accused
and is a breach of the individual’s privacy.
Finally, diminishing meaningful choice also has normative consequences. The individual in this case is used as a means to an end; they
become a tool for obtaining the incriminating confession, which is
antithetical to preserving human dignity as a “benchmark of the values
underlined by the Charter of Rights”.153 Going to great lengths to identify
and use an individual’s weakness to extract information, by alienating them
from real life and making them believe in a fake reality, is a form of assault
that diminishes “the concept of individual within society,” 154 and it works to
deprive the individual of “independent selfhood and the dignity that flows
from being an independent, moral agent”.155
The individual thus becomes a puppet of the state, whose sole value
over months is to build a case against herself. If, as Plaxton suggested, the
right against self-incrimination protects against “the State’s annexation of
the citizen’s moral landscape, its control over individual’s internal
determination of guilt or innocence”,156 then attracting someone into a
criminal organization for the purpose of such manipulation is surely a
breach of the right.157 This right, as Paciocco stated, rests on personal
autonomy and privacy of the mind, wherein their subversion is inherent “in
the revulsion that elevated the principle against self-incrimination into a
vital legal principle”.158 To lure someone into a criminal organization
especially created for them, and to have expert psychologists and trained
agents design the scenarios so that the particular individual cannot resist it,
is quintessentially taking control over someone’s autonomy, and accessing
information “stored in the memory of the accused” in a manner that violates
“the privacy of the mind, the last refuge of the individual”. 159
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Thus, there are concerns raised by Mr. Big operations that are either
inadequately minimized by the current framework (such as abuse of process
or issues related to the coherence of the system) or are ignored (such as issues
related to autonomy and dignity).160 To conclude, if the right against selfincrimination is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 because “it is a
corollary of the principle of a case to meet, which defines the accusatorial
system, which in turn exists in order to vindicate the rule of law” 161 and
which upholds normative concepts related to individual autonomy and
dignity, as well as pragmatic norms prohibiting the state from using its
power to manipulate the accused, then the continued existence of Mr. Big
operations frustrates the spirit of the law on all levels and makes a mockery
of the Charter’s “benchmark values”.162

IV. Conclusion
If, as described in Hebert, the pre-trial right against self-incrimination
is about preventing police from obtaining indirectly — through oppression
and trickery — that which the law prevents them from obtaining directly, 163
then excluding Mr. Big from the application of s. 7 because the individual is
not in physical state custody is arbitrary. Despite the holdings in Hart and
Mack, Mr. Big operations are in and of themselves a violation of every
principle underlying the right against self-incrimination and thus of the
Charter. By design, they undermine the adversarial system. They are
oppressive because they are built around using overwhelming state
resources to identify and then trigger individual pressure points that lead
to confessions. These tactics also undermine individual autonomy and
dignity by transforming the individual into a state puppet.
The Hart framework has done little to uphold the core values of the
principle against self-incrimination, and the operation continues to be legal
with minimal oversight. However, as Archie Kaiser beautifully put it, “it is
because of its efficacy [in obtaining convictions] not its procedural elegance
or constitutional fidelity that Mr. Big has survived to live another day”. 164
Recognizing that the very structure of these operations triggers the
application of s. 7 would have significant consequences. Though the remedy
of the exclusion of evidence is not automatic for a breach of Charter rights,
where s. 7 is breached, the evidence tends to be excluded. This is consonant
with the fact that the right against self-incrimination and the presumption of
innocence do not generally lend themselves to a balancing of interests. 165
160
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Rather, where engaged, evidence is often unsalvageable. Thus, recognizing
that every Mr. Big sting triggers the application of s. 7 would provide
constitutional grounds for the dismantlement of these operations. As
effective as they may be in obtaining convictions, the cost of those
convictions may come at too great of a cost for individual rights and the
integrity of the justice system. To cite Professor Kaiser, “if the Crown
cannot prove its case without doing violence to so many principles ‘then it’s
better that the case not be proven.’”166
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